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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case

This

is

a divorce case, and Jackie

ate appellate decision

is

appealing the District Court’s intermedi-

0n a single issue of property characterization.1

Concise Statement of FactsZCourse of Proceedings

In 1988,

Ranch.
1, p.

the

Rodger inherited half ofthe “Swanson Ranch,"

(R. Vol. 1, p. 32).

On May

27, 2000, Jackie

31). In 2013, while the parties

were

still

i.e.,

half 0f his family’s

and Rodger were married.

(R. Vol.

married, Rodger sold his interests in

Swanson Ranch on an installment contract basis.

(R. Vol. 5, p. 754).

The

parties

deposited the installment payments into a joint Wells Fargo account and then into
several different

Swanson bank accounts.

(R. V01. 5, pp.

755-56). In July 2016, after

sixteen years 0f marriage, the parties separated. (R. V01.
petition for divorce

Before the
trace the

on January

trial,

was

method to trace these

1n.

4-8). Mr.

Rodger

filed his

his expert witness t0

sale proceeds. (R. Vol. 5, p. 752). Mr.

Smith admitted that

Swanson Ranch]...ended

Smith used a LIFO

(i.e.,

a "last-in-first-out”)

sale proceeds. (R. V01. 11, p. 2117, 1n. 15-24; p. 2118, 1n. 1-13).

This case involved a substantial

amount

of property division

and Characterization, but Jackie

limiting this appeal to a single issue of property characterization,

bursements."

31).

17).

limited to “where the dollars from [the

up." (R. Vol. 11, p. 2110,

1

1, p.

Rodger hired David M. Smith, CPA, as

Swanson Ranch

his analysis

12, 2017. (R. Vol.

1, p.

(R. Vol. 1, pp. 53, 69). Jackie believes that

i.e.,

the alleged

“unknown

is

dis-

the Magistrate Court erred in characterizing

these disbursements and that the District Court erred by upholding that characterization.
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However, Mr. Smith went beyond tracing the Swanson Ranch sale proceeds and rendered several gratuitous opinions on community property.
Jackie's appeal

tion of Mr. Smith’s

is

centered 0n one ofthese gratuitous opinions,

02inion #15

to

a

1:

- Unknown Disbursements

of accounting

degree

certainty,

$1,130,000.00 were made from accounts held
not be traced with the information

of the two disbursements

community properly

(R. Vol. 5, p.

that a por-

Summary of Mr. Smith's Opinion

have examined the bank account transactions

reasonable

i.e.,

"unknown disbursements” was community property:

Table

l

(R. Vol. 5, p. 770).

is

|

in

the

that

and

my

opinion,

two disbursements

totaling

in this case,

it

is

name of Jackie Swanson.

was provided. The

that could

separate property proceeds portion

$224,433.06. The remaining $905,566.94 has been traced as

funds.

769) [highlights added).

However, the record shows that Mr. Smith did not actually trace these "un-

known disbursements" in terms of identifying their source. Instead, Mr. Smith relied
0n the "assumptions"
tify as sale

listed earlier in his report,

money or separate property was

i.e.,

that anything he could not iden-

divisible

community property:

(table continued to next page)
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Table

2:

The Basis for Mr. Smith’s Opinion

Basis for the Opinion
This

assumptions

unknown

the

accounting for community versus
listed

above on page

distributions

(R. Vol. 5, p.

3.

property

based

is

on the

See Appendix #5 and Appendix #8 for the tracing of

and the allocation of separate versus community property.

769) [highlights added).

Mr. Smith confirmed at
“nonsale.” (R. Vol. 11, p. 2151,

1n.

trial

that he labeled any

unknown

deposits as

1—8) (“I’m only looking for those proceeds

sale ofthe separate property. Everything else

p.

separate

is

assumed t0 be nonsale."];

from the

(R. V01. 5,

753) ("The Accounting included for this case...includes deposits during the mar-

riage as

community property, unless

tified").

Mr. Smith also said that he

by the Defendant,

Jackie

a source of separate property

was “not aware

(if

any)

is

of any separate property

Swanson, before or after the marriage.”

(R. Vol. 5, p.

iden-

owned
754].

After hearing that testimony, the Magistrate Court asked Mr. Smith whether
his

community property

analysis

would change

shown to be part ofIackie’s separate property.

if

some

of the disbursements

(R. Vol. 11, p.

2153,

1n.

upon your presumption...that if [money] wasn't separate property,
to

it

were

13-17) (“Based

was presumed

be community property...if any of that was Jackie Swanson’s separate property,

would that change the dynamics a

little bit?").

Mr. Smith acknowledged that his

Appellant's Opening Brief
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analysis

would change—at

property. (R. Vol. 11,

p.

least in

2153,

1n.

terms of reducing the amount of community

18-21) (“You’d add a column t0 say here’s the sep-

arate property 0f Iackie...and take

it

out of community.”) (emphasis added).

Jackie gave extensive testimony at trial t0

show

that the alleged

“unknown

disbursements" were part of her separate property. For instance, Jackie testified
that she

came

from her de-

into the parties’ marriage with $730,000.00 received

ceased husband’s estate.

(R. Vol. 11, p.

2223,

16-23). Jackie also testified that she

1n.

put these funds (and accrued interest) into six separate certificates 0f deposit
(”CD5"). (R. V01. 11, p. 2307,

testified that

1n.

1-19; p. 2218,

9-15;

p.

2217,

1n.

20-24). Jackie

her CDs matured in 2016 and that she had “rolled them over into a

money market."

(R. Vol. 11, p.

come from Rodger’s

2217,

had

six

11-24)? Jackie

1n.

testified that the

or the Ranches’ money. (R. Vol. 11,

The Magistrate Court accepted
fact that she

1n.

Jackie’s

p.

2217,

1n.

CDs did not

20-24).

unrebutted testimony, and found as

separate CDs and that they constituted at least $882,000.00 of

the annuities purchases. (Findings ofFact and Conclusions ofLaw, R. Vol.

The Court acknowledged that the CD5 were converted into annuities
dren and that these "retains
66).

2

The Court acknowledged

Jackie Clarified that the
1n.

[their] identity" as

15-25;

p.

2300,

1n.

Jackie’s right to

CDs had been turned

1-25; p. 2301,

1n.

100%
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(161.,

pp. 47,

of the annuities as her

into annuities. (R. Vol. 11, p. 2219,

1-13).

46).

for Jackie’s chil-

her separate property.

keep

1, p.

1n.

2-15; p. 2299,

separate property, saying: “Ms. Swanson had enough separate property to finance
this

$1,000,000 [annuity] purchase."

(R. Vol. 1, p. 66).

Nevertheless, the Magistrate Court ultimately (and inexplicably) adopted Mr.
Smith’s opinion that $905,566.94 0fthe

property. (R. Vol.

the

1, p.

53).

“unknown disbursements" were community

The Court ignored

“unknown disbursements" contained the

(R. Vol. 1, pp.

testimony which showed that

rollover

money for Jackie’s

annuities.

66-70). As such, the Court ordered Jackie to pay t0 Rodger one-half 0f

the alleged disbursement,
of the

Jackie’s

i.e.,

one-half of $905,566.00 0r $452,738.00, as his share

community interest in the disbursements.

(R. V01. 1, p. 69). In total,

the Court

ordered Jackie t0 pay Rodger $824,341.00—m0re than half ofwhich constituted the
alleged

community portion

of the

"unknown disbursements.

(R. Vol. 1, p. 73).

Jackie appealed the matter to the District Court. (R. V01.

1, p.

78).

The

District

Court merely affirmed the Magistrate Court’s findings and conclusions 0n the “un-

known

disbursements,"

A

(R. V01. 1, pp.

161-62), explaining in

its

decision:

if they are supported by suband competent evidence. Worzala v. Worzala, 128 Idaho 408, 41 1,
913 P.2d 1178, 1181 (1996). Substantial and competent evidence must support a finding and constitutes such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate t0 support a conclusion. Matter ofDoes II, 163 Idaho 399,
401, 414 P.3d 221, 223 (2018). An expert Who had thoroughly examined all
the separate and community funds of the family found that the missing funds
were community property. The testimony at trial established that Jackie
largely had control over and unmonitored access to the community funds,
and she testified that none of her separate funds (outside 0f the repaid loans)
were ever in an account with Rodgers' name. Jackie produced no evidence at
trial t0 support any other theory regarding the missing funds so the Court

magistrate’s findings 0f fact will be upheld

stantial

Appellant's Opening Brief
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necessarily relied 0n the evidence provided.
that the missing funds

A

reasonable mind could find

were community property and that they were

Jackie’s hands.

(R. Vol. 1, p.

162) (emphasis added).
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in

ISSUES

.

Was there a substantial and competent basis in the
istrate Court’s decision

.

ON APPEAL

Was there
Is

a basis to

record to affirm the Mag-

on the “unknown disbursements"?

award

Jackie entitled t0 costs

costs

and

fees

on intermediate appeal?

and attorney fees 0n appeal?

Appellant's Opening Brief| Page 11

STANDARD OF REVIEW
“Prior to Losser,

late capacity the

court acting in

when this Court reviewed a district court acting in its appel-

standard 0f review was: ‘when reviewing a decision of the district

its

appellate capacity, this Court will review the record and the mag-

istrate court’s decision

independently 0f, but with due regard

decision.’ After Losser, this

sion. Rather,

Pelayo,

it is

bound

for,

the district court's

Court does not directly review a magistrate court's deci-

to affirm or reverse the district court’s decision." Pelayo

v.

154 Idaho 855, 859, 303 P.3d 214, 218 (2013).

“When reviewing
appellate court: ‘The

the decision of a district court sitting in

Supreme Court reviews the

determine whether there
istrate's findings of fact

is

substantial

trial

its

capacity as an

court (magistrate) record to

and competent evidence to support the mag-

and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from

those findings.” Grifﬁths

v.

Griffiths,

469 P.3d 615, 621 (2020).
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ARGUMENT
1.

There is no evidence in the record t0 show that the “unknown disbursements" were divisible community property; the evidence shows only
that the disbursements were part of the rollover of lackie’s CDs into her
separate annuities and that it was reversible error to award Rodger half
the value of lackie's separate property transaction.
The Supreme Court should reverse the

District Court’s appellate decision be-

cause there was absolutely n0 evidence (only bare assumptions) to support Mr.
Smith’s opinion that the

separate property,

and

it

was

i.e.,

community prop-

the evidence

a reversible error to order Jackie to reimburse Rodger for a transac-

is all

not

is

debatable—as

fairly

one-sided in Jackie's favor. Of course, Jackie acknowledges that

the Magistrate Court has discretion divide

community property. See Simplot v. Sim-

96 Idaho 239, 526 P.2d 844 (1974). However, that discretion

is

not unlimited

constrained "by the exercise of reason." Lunneborg

v.

My Fun

856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018). But in Jackie's case,

it

was not an

and

is

Jackie’s

they were part 0f the rollover 0f Jackie's CDs into her annui-

tion that involved her separate property. This question

plot,

divisible

The evidence shows that the disbursements were a known part of

erty.

ties,

“unknown disbursements" were

Life,

163 Idaho
exercise of

reason to accept Mr. Smith's assumptions. The District Court should have reversed
the Magistrate’s findings because “expert opinion, which

or unsubstantiated by facts in the record

is

is

speculative, conclusory,

0f n0 assistance...and therefore

Appellant's Opening Brief| Page 13

is

inadmissible as evidence." Bromley

v.

Garey, 132 Idaho 807, 811,

979 P.2d 1165,

1169 (1999).

To

start,

that Jackie

the Magistrate Court held [and the District Court confirmed) that

was required to reimburse Rodger for one-half 0f the

portion 0f the

“unknown

Table

alleged

community

distributions,” as seen in the following table:

3:

Magistrate Court's Awards to Rodger

Io_tal_§

Separate property belonging to Mr. Swanson:

Community property

$ 950,000

interests:

l.

Community property from transfer:

$ 30,000

2.

Community property

in accounts:

$ 66,461

3.

Community property

interest in

unknown distribution:

TOTAL

(R. Vol. 1, p.

3

$ 452,783
$1,499,244

69 (highlights added)).3

should be noted that the Magistrate Court was free to assume that any “unknown disbursements"
were community property without Mr. Smith's analysis. Idaho case law says: “It is recognized that
there is a presumption that all property acquired by the spouses during coverture is community
property." Stahl v. Stahl, 91 Idaho 794, 797, 430 P.2d 685, 688 (1967). In other words, the Magistrate Court did not need to rely on Mr. Smith’s alleged Rule 702 analysis to characterize the “unknown disbursements” as community property. 0n appeal, the District Court erred in upholding
Mr. Smith's community property analysis because it could not point to anything that Mr. Smith said
It

analysis—other than to state that Mr. Smith “was accepted as an expert
Smith would have access t0 the discovery documents
provided by the parties including financial statements.” (R. Vol. 1, p. 161). The fact that Mr. Smith

to verify or substantiate his
in following

monies or

tracing...[and] Mr.

Appellant's Opening Brief
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That decision was not consistent with the

facts, as

Mr. Smith's supporting

data shows [at several points in his exhibits) that the alleged "unknown disburse-

ments” were part ofthe rollover funds. For instance, Mr. Smith's analysis ofthe EICU

Money Market Account #3407-50 shows

that Jackie

made

six

uniform deposits of

$146,982.07 just prior to the time of the alleged "unknown disbursements":

Table
East Eda ho Credit Union
Jackie

4: Exhibit

8 from Mr. Smiths' Report

Money Market MUV-EO

M Swansdn

Date

Separate

community

Withdrawal

Withdrawal

Deposits

Deposits

Community

Sep

Cammuniw

Com rnunity

Intern st

Fees

Balance

7/3 1/2015

2 5.40

258,109.18

813 UZGIE

43.84

253,153.02

9f4f2016

gfsfmlé
93012016

'

(18.15102)
1 7,585.41

240,000.00

14,59

253,000.00

42.02

10I3 1/2016

253,042.02

43.83

258,085.85

uﬂaﬂﬂlﬁ

146,982.07

11l23/2016

14638240?

551M939

1133:7016

“6,982.0?

699,032.06

146,982.07

8&6,01£.1 3

11/23.!2016

ulzsfzols

-

HRERUIE

405.0673]

1453810?

992,996.20

146,932.07

1,139,978.27

(mmsal

1130/2016

(R. Vol. 5, p.

so,

140,024.38

891) (highlights added)). Mr. Smith failed t0 account for these

deposits in terms of explaining the alleged

done

45.61

[94.43306]

"unknown disbursements."

Mr. Smith would have easily discovered (from his

the deposits had already been identified as Jackie's

CD

own

If

he had

exhibit data) that

rollover funds:

(table continued to next page)

is

credentialed

is

not enough to uphold his opinions on appeal—especially when Mr. Smith admits

that he based his opinions on a series 0f unproven assumptions.
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Table

5:

Exhibit 10 from Mr. Smith's Report

01¢ Wells Fargo 4-455

1144 EICU
1145 Eicu

1146 Elcu
1147 Elcu
1148 Elcu

1149 Elcu

llldbltUlb

Mny Mrk 3407-50
Mny Mrk 3407-50
Mny Mrk 340150
Mny Mrk 3407-50
Mny Mrk 34:17-50
Mny Mrk 3407-50

-b,UUU.UU

11128/2016

146,982.07

11/28/2016

145,932.07

11/28,’2016

145.9810?

11/28/2015

146,952.07

11128/2016

146.9810?

11/23/2015

145,982.07

1177 EICU C01

11l28/2016

446,982.07

1133 Elcu £02

11/28/2015

(146,982.07)

1139 EICU cos

1112812016

-146,982.07

cm

11/28/2015

446,982.07

1201 EICU cos

11/28.!2016

446,962.07

1207 EICU cos

ulzsfzcns

446,982.07

SOS Wells Fargo 9759

11/29/2016

450.36

1056 EICU Shares 3407-9

11129;:016

60.00

90 Wells fargo £475

11/30f2016

1195 Elcu

(R. Vol. 5, p.

838) [highlights added).

As seen above, Mr. Smith had already labeled these
"EICU CD" deposit funds. This

fact

matches

six deposits as Jackie's

Iackie’s extensive

testimony about the

deposits. See Concise Statement ofFactS, above. Mr. Smith should have recognized

this fact

when attempting t0

any event, the

District

characterize the alleged

“unknown disbursements."

In

Court should have recognized the conﬂict between Mr.

Smith's assumptions and his report data and refused to uphold the assumptions.

The

District

Court should have found that there was not a substantial and competent

basis in the evidence (just bare assumptions] to support Mr. Smith's

bursements" analysis. The

on

this issue

mony,

i.e.,

District

dis-

Court should have reversed the Magistrate Court

and remanded the judgment

that the

“unknown

for findings consistent

with Iackie's

“unknown disbursements” were part of her separate

Appellant's Opening Brief
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testi-

property.

Under Mr. Smith’s “LIFO”
trate Court should

analysis, (R. Vol.

1,

pp. 2117-22, 2135), the Magis-

have attributed the “unknown disbursements" to the

last

known

deposit source. For instance, Mr. Smith illustrated that even a small deposit should
dictate the character of a

1n.

17-25;

2136,

p.

much larger subsequent withdrawal.

1n. 1-6), (R.

Vol. 5, p.

(R. Vol. 11, pp.

2135,

806) (where Mr. Smith shows a $40,000.00

withdrawal would deplete the available community balance of $33,987.79 because
the last two deposits, $496.32 and $497.04 respectively,
In this case, the record

into the

shows—beyond

EICU #3407-50 account were the

all

were community deposits).

dispute—that the

constitute—under a LIFO theory—the withdrawal of

or divisible

It is

call

known

deposits

six CD-rollover deposits. Thus, the alleged

”unknown disbursements" which followed immediately

Mr. Smith simply had no basis to

last

the disbursements

after the

CD

deposits

must

Jackie’s separate property.

community disbursements

community property.
important to note that the alleged community portion of the “unknown

disbursements" ($905,566.94)

is

not an actual withdrawal amount but rather a con-

venient fiction created by Mr. Smith. There were four actual disbursements on

11/30

in the

amount

of $250,000.00 each, as seen in the following table:

(table continued t0 next page)
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Table

6:

Disbursements Summary

ﬂONEYIIARKET

850

Tumou- mama

9mm
mmermwmmmnm

1m:

11m
11m

moms
46.05.92

mmemmmc-zm1m
mmrmmmmoamnm
mm‘rmmmmumum

11:23
11:23

mm.”
899mm
845,514.13

mm‘rmmmmc-smnm
annoepmmsiutmumcemum
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(R. Vol. 5, p.

This

855) [highlights added).

disbursement

summary

is

particularly

important

because

the

$250,000.00 withdrawal amounts are consistent with Jackie's testimony that she
rolled her

In

CDs

into four $250,000.00 annuities. (R. Vol. 11, p. 2219,

1n.

2-13).

sum, the undisputed evidence [from Mr. Smith's data and Jackie’s

mony) showed that the alleged "unknown disbursements" were

testi-

a demonstrable

part of Jackie’s separate rollover funds. Mr. Smith's assumptions were not evidence,

and
ble

it

was error for the

District Court t0 regard that

which was 'unknown' as

community property.
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divisi-

The Magistrate

Court’s Errors

The Magistrate Court committed the same error as Mr. Smith,

i.e.,

the Court

ignored Jackie’s evidence that “unknown disbursements" consisted 0f the rollover

funds into her separate annuities. Jackie confirmed that she had completed that process Via the EICU

#3407-50 account.

(R. Vol. 11, p.

2219,

1n.

2-15).

Even Mr. Smith

had acknowledged that the community portion 0f the “unknown disbursements"
($905,566.94) took place on 11/30 in the EICU #3407-50 account.

(R. V01. 5, pp.

838, 855). As such, the Magistrate Court should have concluded that the

disbursements"

(at least

rolling over Jackie's six

The Court erred

count.5

up

t0 the $905,566.94

CDs
in

819,

"unknown

amount4) was due to the process 0f

into her four annuities using the

EICU #3407-50

adopting Mr. Smith’s assumptions in the matter,

i.e.,

ac-

that

he couldn’t identify the source of the EICU #3407-50 disbursements and therefore
the disbursements were part of the divisible

community property.

The Magistrate Court should have recognized the limited nature of Mr.
Smith’s analysis,

rything else as

i.e.,

that he had identified the ranch sale proceeds and labeled eve-

community property. The Court should have

rejected Mr. Smith’s re-

sulting opinions in the matter as being totally speculative/unfounded. See Concise

4

more than enough to reverse the order to divide the "unknown disbursebecause the Magistrate Court found elsewhere that “Ms. Swanson had enough
separate property to finance [her] $1,000,000 [annuity] purchase." (R. Vol. 1, p. 66).
Jackie does not need to address the balance of the "unknown disbursements" ($224,433.06) beThis type of finding

ments"

5

is

in its entirety

cause Mr. Smith concedes that

it

was part 0f Jackie's separate

property. See Table
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1.

Statement ofFactS, above. See also State
P.3d 618, 621

(Ct.

is

is

speculative; testimony

about a matter as t0 which evidence

is

844 P.2d

24,

would not

25

(Ct.

162 Idaho 833, 836, 405

not based upon a proper factual
speculative

is

when

it

theorizes

not sufficient for certain knowledge; an opin-

speculative suggests only possibilities and

is

since the opinion

46,

CaIiZ-Bautista,

App. 2017) (when an opinion

foundation, that opinion

ion that

v.

assist the trier of fact);

may be

Ryan

App. 1992) (Citing Landrigan

v.

v.

properly excluded

Beisner,

123 Idaho 42,

Celotex C0rp., 127

N.].

404,

605 A.2d 1079, 1084 (1992) (the admissibility 0f expert opinion testimony depends
on the expert's

ability to explain pertinent scientific principles

and

to apply those

principles to the formulation of his or her opinion; thus, the key t0 admission of the

opinion
tion

the validity of the expert's reasoning and methodology; the court's func-

to distinguish scientifically

is

expert,

liefs);

is

who

sound reasoning from that 0f the

self—validating

uses scientific terminology to present unsubstantiated personal be-

Bromley

Garey, 132 Idaho 807, 811,

v.

979 P.2d 1165, 1169 (1999) (Expert

opinion must be based upon a proper factual foundation; opinion that merely suggests possibilities

It

was

would only invite conjecture and may be properly excluded).

reversible error for the Magistrate Court (or the District Court) to

place controlling weight on Mr. Smith’s assumptions, given the limited scope of his

analysis.

It

was

consistently acknowledged that the EICU

Jackie’s separate account. (R. Vol. 1, p. 46) ("Ms.

#3407-50 account was

Swanson, through her Exhibit
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K,

would have

six

CDs

at approximately $147,000.00 each

separate accounts.");

Vol.

(R.

1,

(“Ms.

159)

p.

which would come from her

Swanson has approximately

$730,000.00 in investments and liquid assets. She kept this property separate and
apart from the community after marriage."). The Magistrate Court should have

found that Jackie’s rollover
account, fully explained the

activities

within that account,

community portion

of the

i.e.,

the EICU #3407-50

“unknown disbursements,"

at

least to the extent of the four $250,000.00 annuity purchases. Again, the Magistrate

Court has already acknowledged Jackie’s separate annuity purchases and the fact
that she had

66).

enough separate property to make the purchases.

The Court should have accepted the testimony (and other

that the rollover process accounted for the

(R. Vol. 1, pp.

46-47,

clear evidence) that

"unknown disbursements."

Idaho case law says: “The presumption that property acquired during marriage

is

community

is

controlling only

the specific property." Stahl

was not impossible

known

for Mr.

disbursements. In

v.

when

Stahl, at p.

it is

798

impossible to trace the source of

(internal citations omitted). Here,

it

Smith 0r the Court t0 trace the source 0f the alleged un-

fact, it

should have been easy for Mr. Smith (or the Court)

to trace the funds, but Mr. Smith refused (or failed) to

do

so,

leaving the Magistrate

Court with a duty to accept Jackie’s testimony as to the separateness of the disbursementS.
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The Magistrate Court did not base

its

ments" 0n substantial and competent evidence. See Kelly
(2019) (an abuse of discretion

is

"unknown

findings on the

Kelly,

v.

disburse-

451 P.3d 429

found when the magistrate court's findings are

clearly erroneous such that the court's findings are not

competent evidence); Idaho Dep’t ofHeaIth & Welfare

v.

based on substantial and

Doe

(In re Doe],

486, 432 P.3d 35 (2018) (substantial and competent evidence

is

164 Idaho

such evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate t0 support a conclusion).

The Magistrate Court was bound to accept Jackie’s uncontradicted testimony
in the matter.

See First

(the trial court

Tr.

& Sav. Bank v.

must accept as true the

ible witness, unless his

testimony

and circumstances disclosed

is

modes known to
In

the law

positive, uncontradicted

testimony of a cred-

inherently improbable, or rendered so by facts

at the hearing or the trial; the trial court

trarily or capriciously disregard the

the

Randall, 59 Idaho 705, 89 P.2d 741 (1939)

if

may not arbi-

testimony of a witness unimpeached by any of

such testimony does not exceed probability).

sum, the Supreme Court should find that Jackie disproved Mr. Smith’s as-

sumptions because she proved the alleged “unknown disbursements" were part of
the rollovers into her separate annuities. The
trict Court’s appellate

tion in the matter.

Supreme Court should reverse the Dis-

decision and find that the Magistrate Court abused

The Supreme Court should direct the

District
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its

discre-

Court to remand the

matter and direct the Magistrate Court t0 reduce

its

judgment by

at least

$452,783.00 and enter an amended decree of divorce.

2.

The

District Court

as to the

Erred by Upholding the Magistrate Court's Decision

“Unknown Disbursements."

For the reasons set out above, and for the additional reasons set out below,
the District Court erred by upholding the Magistrate Court’s decision as to the “un-

known disbursements” on intermediate
First,

appeal.

the District Court acknowledged that Jackie had substantial separate

property and investment interests.

(R. Vol. 1, p. 159).

stated, incorrectly, that "at the conclusion 0f the

proximately $1,000,000 for her Children."

(Id).

However, the

marriage

As

[Jackie]

District Court

had put aside ap-

set out above, the only instance

where Jackie had put away money for her children was when she

rolled over her

CD

funds into the annuities for her children. See above. By adopting this false premise,
i.e.,

that the four (4) $250,000.00 withdraws

District

the CDs to the annuities

6

rollover funds, the

Court compounded the errors of the Magistrate Court by contradicting one

of the key findings of the Magistrate Court,

District

were not part of the

was

Court erred because

still

it

i.e.,

that the $1,000,000.00 rollover from

Jackie’s separate property. (R. V01. 1, p. 66).6

The

refused to account for Jackie’s separate property.

Jackie would note that the Magistrate Court made a separate finding that she had transferred
$950,000.00 0f Rodger’s separate property t0 her bank accounts. (R. Vol. 1, p. 66). Jackie does not
dispute that finding on appeal nor the Magistrate’s decision to give Rodger a property division
credit 0f $950,000.00. (R. Vol. 1, p. 69). This recognition is important because the District Court
goes on to address the $950,000.00 transfer(s) as a separate matter—showing that any discussion
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The
the

District Court

admitted that the Magistrate Court “based

unknown disbursements]

report.” (R. Vol.

1, p.

largely

its

decision [on

on the assumption of Mr. Smith given

161). For the reasons set out above,

it

was error for the

in his

District

Court to uphold Mr. Smith’s unproven assumptions. The District Court should have

found that Jackie’s testimony disproved Mr. Smith’s assumptions and that

it

was

re-

versible error for the Magistrate Court to adopt the assumptions.

The

District

that ]ackie...did

all

Court explained that Magistrate Court “also considered the fact
the bookkeeping, and that Rodger did not question her, nor did

her balance the books...[and that] the only separate property of hers that were ever
deposited in the accounts with Rodger’s
repaid to her"

(R. Vol. 1, pp.

name on them were loans

161-62). But these facts—even

if

all

of which

were

accepted—do not sup-

port a conclusion that the “unknown disbursements" were part of the divisible com-

munity property. For example, they don’t

alter Jackie's

undisputed testimony that

she rolled her CDs into separate annuities, as found by the Trial Court.
66).

The

District Court erred

by accepting these

(R. Vol. 1, p.

facts as substantial or

competent

evidence.

The

District Court

concluded that "a magistrate’s findings of fact will be up-

held ifthey are supported by substantial and competent evidence."

(R. V01. 1, p. 162).

ofthe $1,000,000 withdrawal could only belong to the issue oflackie’s separate property annuities.
(R. Vol. 1, p. 66).
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But the District Court did not actually examine Mr. Smith’s analysis and seems to

have “rubber-stamped" the analysis used by the Trial Court, saying:
(table continued t0 next page)
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Table

7:

The

District Court’s Conclusion

A magistrate’s ﬁndings 0f ﬁlm will be upheld ifthey am suppcmed by substantial and
competent evidence.

Wanda v1 Wanda,

Substantial and competent evidence

reasonable

399,

40L

mind might accept

were ever

8).

l

178,

I

181 (1996);

Matter ofDoes H. 163 Idaho

An expert who had thoroughly Examined all the separate
that ﬁle

at trial established that Jackie largely

ftmds, and she testiﬁed that

'm

91 3 PL2d

as adequate t0 support a conclusion.

4 I4 P.3d 22 1 , 223 (201

community

l,

must support a ﬁnding and constitutes such evidence as a

and community funds ofthe family found
testimony

128 Idaho 408, 41

missing funds were community property. The

had control over and unmunitored access to ﬁle

none of her separate funds (outside of the repaid loans)

an account with Rodgers’ name.

Jackie produced no evidence a1

trial

to support

any other theory regarding the missing funds so the Court necessarily relied on the evidence
provided.

A reasonable mind could ﬁnd that the missing ﬁmds were community property and

that they were in Jackie’s hands.

162) [highlights added).

(R. Vol. 1, p.

But the record shows the

ﬂaw

in this reasoning.

Mr. Smith did not do any

community tracing analysis (he just made assumptions), and

in fact Jackie

gave un-

rebutted testimony as to her alternate theory—indeed, the only theory—for the

missing funds,

CD

i.e.,

that the alleged

“unknown disbursement” funds were part

rollover into her separate annuities. See,

Supreme Court should reverse the
The

District

Court

e.g.,

R. V01. 11, p.

District Court's conclusion

said, “the Magistrate

2217,

on

1n.

of the

11-24. The

this issue.

Court gave Mr. Smith the deference

he was due and relied on the only evidence given regarding the proper accounting
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method
surely

t0 determine separate

it

and community property."

(R. Vol. 1, p. 161).

But

it

cannot reasonably be said that Mr. Smith gave any actual evidence about

something he admitted not knowing anything about---what he called “unknown

dis-

bursements." Rodger could have introduced a hundred such expert reports, but that

would not have changed the
tiary value.

The

fact that the analysis

District Court should

was

speculative and of no eviden-

have found that Mr. Smith’s assumptions were

not entitled to any deference. See Pierstorﬂ v. Gray's Auto Shop, 58 Idaho 438, 74
P.2d 171 (1937) (the court

may

reject testimony

if it is

inherently improbable or

rendered so by facts and circumstances disclosed at the hearing 0r trial).

The
fees

District

on intermediate appeal.

(R. Vol. 1, p. 165).

did not have a basis to uphold the
ate appeal and, therefore,

other issues,

e.g.,

entitled to costs

and attorney

As set out above, the

District Court

Court concluded that Rodger

is

“unknown disbursements"

findings on intermedi-

Rodger should not have prevailed on appeal. As

the cattle valuation and

Swanson Ranch

t0 Jackie’s

contributions, the record

shows that Jackie was not merely “second guessing" the Magistrate Court’s decisions
and that she had a good
157). At a

faith basis t0

minimum, the

part and that

it

parties in a fair

appeal the issues.

District Court should

was appropriate

(R. Vol. 1, pp.

have found that Jackie prevailed

to "apportion the costs

and equitable manner

100-07, 127in

between and among the

after considering all of the issues

and Claims

involved in the action and the resultant judgment or judgments obtained."
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I.R.F.L.P.

901(B). The Supreme Court should reverse the District Court’s award 0f costs and
fees with instructions that Jackie has

peal,

i.e.,

the

now prevailed on the weightiest issue on

“unknown disbursements,” and

that

it

ap-

was error to consider Rodger as

the prevailing party in light of his success on the minor issues on appeal.7

The

District Court properly

reduced the

final

judgment

to $804,341.00

to a Clerical error in the Magistrate Court’s calculations. (R. Vol.

District

1, p.

due

165). But the

Court did not go far enough and failed t0 remove the "unknown disburse-

ments" award. The Supreme Court should

now reverse the

District Court's errone-

ous decision on the “unknown disbursements” and instruct the Magistrate Court to
enter an

amended judgment of $351,558.00

(, i.e.,

the adjusted judgment

amount

of

$804,341.00 minus the $452,783.00 in “unknown disbursements").

3.

lackie

Has Suffered Substantial Harm to Her Rights.

The Magistrate and District Courts have prejudiced Jackie’s rights. See
61. Specifically, the Magistrate Court

is

I.R.C.P.

ordering Jackie to pay Rodger $452,783.00

on a transaction which was shown to be part of her separate property. Jackie
titled, as

is

en-

a matter of law, to keep the $452,783.00 as part of her separate property.

See Idaho Code § 32-903. The District Court has compounded this error by refusing
t0 address Jackie's unrebutted testimony. This

7

The

District

Court did just render a decision on Rodger's

outcome—forcing Jackie

memorandum

of costs

and

t0

fees.

pp. 10-11). Jackie respectfully reserves the right t0 address the substance 0f that decision

memorandum of costs and fees

in

her reply brief or in a supplemental
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brief.

pay

Aug. R.

on the

hundreds 0f thousands of dollars based 0n an assumption—is not consistent with
notions of substantial justice. See Burgess

v.

Salmon River Canal

903 P.2d 730 (1995). The Supreme Court should reverse

4.

lackie

Jackie

is

is

Entitled to Attorney Fees

entitled to attorney fees

is

known

127 Idaho 565,

on appeal.

this issue

and Costs on Appeal.

and costs 0n appeal

olous 0r unfounded defenses t0 her appeal. See

Idaho follows what

C0,,

I.A.R.

in the

35(a)(5) and

event of any frivI.A.R. 40, 41.

as the “American Rule” for attorney fees

which

holds that “n0 fee awards are available absent contractual 0r statutory authority."

Sopatyk

v.

Lemhi County, 151 Idaho 809, 819, 264 P.3d 916, 926 (2011).

If

Rodger

continues to advance Mr. Smith’s unfounded community property assumptions, the

Supreme Court should award
I.R.F.L.P.

Jackie her fees

under Idaho Code § 12-121 and/or

908. This statute applies to cases 0n appeal. See Sinclair& C0.

Idaho 362, 367, 757 P.2d 225, 230
the prevailing party on appeal
that the appeal

(Ct.

v.

Gurule,

114

App. 1988) (attorney fees will be awarded to

when the Supreme Court is left with the abiding belief

was brought, pursued,

or defended frivolously, unreasonably or

without foundation). In sum, the Supreme Court should award Jackie her fees

if

Rodger raises any unfounded arguments from Mr. Smith on appeal.

CONCLUSION
The Magistrate Court did not have a substantial and competent basis

for ac-

cepting Mr. Smith's community property assumptions, and Jackie has provided
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uncontradicted testimony to dispel these assumptions. The District Court should

have reversed the Magistrate Court's decision and remanded the matter, or reduced
Rodger's judgment by $452,783.00 according to the evidence. The Supreme Court

should reverse the District Court’s decision and limit Rodger's payment award to
$351,558.00. Alternatively the Court should vacate and remand the matter for an
accurate division of community property based on the record. The Supreme Court

should award Jackie her costs and attorney fees 0n appeal for any unreasonable or

unfounded response arguments by Rodger,

in

amounts

to

be proven by subsequent

memorandum.
Dated December

1,

2020
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Appellant's Opening Brief| Page 30

CERTIFICATE 0F SERVICE
I

hereby

certify that

on December

1,

2020,

I

served a true copy of this entire

document on the following individuals:

[
[

]

hand delivered

]

mailed postage prepaid

[X]

iCourt

Iames

C.

t0:

to:

to:

Herdon

jherndon@_ida.net

Iohn L. Stosich
i0hnstosich@hotmail.com

,/S,/

Charles B. Bauer

Charles

Appellant's Opening Brief

|

B.

Page 31

Bauer, Attorney

